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I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of October 29, 2012, “Hurricane” Sandy made land-
fall on the New York coastline, battering the land with strong winds,
torrential rain, and record-breaking storm surges.1 Homes and com-
mercial structures were destroyed; roads and tunnels were flooded;
and more than 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary shelters,
with many others facing weeks without power and electricity. At the
time, Sandy was heralded as one of the costliest hurricanes in the his-
tory of the United States; the second costliest hurricane only to Ka-
trina, which hit New Orleans in 2005. Unfortunately, recent
experience with Hurricanes Florence, Maria, Harvey, and Irma sug-
gest that this pattern of devastating superstorms may become the new
norm as climate change produces more extreme and unpredictable
weather events.
In Sandy’s aftermath, as individuals returned to their homes, or
what remained of them, and communities began to rebuild, the true
cost of the storm became apparent. A year after the storm, the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) estimated that over
$1.4 billion in assistance was provided to 182,000 survivors of the dis-
aster; another $3.2 billion was provided to state and local governments
for debris removal, infrastructure repair, and emergency protective
measures. More than $2.4 billion was provided to individuals and busi-
nesses in the form of low-interest loans through the Small Business
Administration (“SBA”), and millions more were spent on grants de-
signed to implement mitigation measures in the future and to provide
unemployment assistance to survivors.
Before the storm, homeowners paid premiums for flood insurance
provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”),
and for homeowner’s insurance provided by dozens of private insur-
ers. In the months following the storm, they began to file claims for
assistance in rebuilding their homes. While many such claims were re-
solved successfully, many homeowners were unhappy with the settle-
ment amounts offered by their insurance carriers and felt compelled
to file lawsuits in the surrounding state and federal courts. Many of
those lawsuits were filed in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (“EDNY”). This case study describes
the EDNY’s specifically crafted, unique approach to handling the
mass litigation that ensued from Sandy’s devastation, documents some
of the problems that the Court faced during that mass litigation, and
describes some of the lessons learned from the Court’s experience.
1. Eric S. Blake et al., Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy (AL182012),
NAT’L HURRICANE CENT. (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL1820
12_Sandy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELD5-2XHK] Sandy began as a Category 1 hurricane
in Jamaica, evolved into a Category 3 hurricane before hitting Cuba, and then de-
volved into a post-tropical cyclone before hitting Brigantine, New Jersey and eastern
New York. Id.
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II. SANDY CASES “FLOOD” THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK
Within one year of Sandy, homeowners began to file lawsuits in the
EDNY.2 The Court quickly became aware of the litigious aspect of
Sandy as several of the early-filed cases were brought by multiple
homeowners of separate properties against a single insurer. Early on,
the Court identified more than twenty such cases involving at least 290
separate properties,3 each of which would eventually be refiled sepa-
rately under its own docket number. By January 2014, over 800 civil
actions were filed in the EDNY by property owners against various
insurers and FEMA. Over time, that total would swell to at least 1,440
cases. Although there were variations in the claims asserted in Sandy
cases, the property owners generally sought damages under two types
of insurance policies—Standard Flood Insurance Policies (“SFIP”) is-
sued under the NFIP and homeowner’s insurance policies issued pur-
suant to New York Insurance Law. These two types of cases became
known as Flood and Wind cases, respectively.4
Flood policies are issued directly by FEMA or private insurers,
which are sometimes referred to as Write-Your-Own Carriers (“WYO
Carriers”).5 WYO Carriers act as “fiscal agents” of the United States,
who must strictly enforce the NFIP and FEMA regulations, and may
only vary the terms of a SFIP with the express written consent of the
Federal Insurance Administrator.6 Standard NFIP policies cover a
2. See e.g., Ursillo v. Farmington Cas. Co., No. 13-CV-5923 (ADS)(AKT) (filed
Oct. 25, 2013); Baiardi v. The Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5912 (SJF)(AKT)
(filed Oct. 28, 2013).
3. See Complaint, Baiardi, et al. v. The Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5912
(SJF)(AKT) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF No. 1 (85 properties joined in one ac-
tion); Complaint, Funk, et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5933 (JS)(GRB)
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF No. 1 (147 properties); Complaint, Downs, et al. v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5957 (CBA)(CLP) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF
No. 1 (11 properties); Complaint, Dante, et al. v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, No. 13-
CV-6297 (ARR)(JO) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 1 (42 properties); Case
Management Order No. 1, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 2014), ECF No. 243 (hereinafter, “CMO No. 1”), at Exhibit A (listing other
mass joined actions).
4. Federal subject matter jurisdiction over Flood cases exists pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 4702 (2016) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal jurisdiction over Wind cases exists
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 4081; 44 C.F.R. 61.13(f) (2017). In many markets the NFIP
represents the primary, if not exclusive provider of flood insurance. See Jacobson v.
Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2012). FEMA adminis-
ters the NFIP, oversees its management, and exercises ultimate authority over pay-
ment or disallowance of claims. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4019 (FEMA authorized to
“prescribe regulations establishing the general method or methods by which proved
and approved claims for losses may be adjusted and paid for any damage to or loss of
property which is covered by flood insurance.”); Durkin v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. A-
99-1304, 2000 WL 146376, *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2000).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1); Palmieri v. Allstate Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 179, 183 (2d
Cir. 2006).
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limit of $250,000 for damage to buildings and $100,000 for personal
property damage.7 More than two-thirds of the Sandy cases involved
claims under SFIPs issued by WYO Carriers or FEMA.8
Insurance companies issue Wind policies pursuant to New York
State insurance law. Such policies cover homes for all risks of physical
loss except those that are specifically excluded, such as losses due to
earthquake, war, nuclear accident, and flood. Policies vary as to cover-
age amounts for building damage, personal property, and deductibles.
Less than one-third of the Sandy cases involved claims under Wind
policies.
III. THE COURT’S RESPONSE TO THE “FLOOD” OF SANDY CASES
By early January 2014, the 800 filed Sandy cases were randomly as-
signed to the twenty-six active and senior district judges, and automat-
ically referred for discovery and pretrial management to sixteen
magistrate judges. Each district judge was asked to handle an addi-
tional thirty to fifty new cases on top of their already heavy civil and
criminal caseloads.9 However, in the absence of a coordinated effort
among the judicial officers, there was a concern about inconsistent rul-
ings on common legal issues and a multiplication of effort on the part
of the judges that would hinder the swift, efficient, and fair resolution
of these cases.
Given these concerns, the EDNY Board of Judges met on January
7, 2014, and appointed a committee of three magistrate judges (the
“Sandy Committee”) to develop, implement, and oversee a system to
handle this inundation of storm-related cases.10 That the Board of
Judges chose to assign the task of managing the Sandy litigation to a
committee of magistrate judges was no mistake. Pursuant to a de-
cades-long practice in the EDNY, magistrate judges are automatically
assigned to all civil cases and are responsible for all pretrial civil
case management from the inception of each case to its dispositional
phase; whether by motion to dismiss, summary judgment, or trial.11
7. SFIPs exclude coverage for damage to basements and damages caused by
“earth movement.”
8. More than 90% of the flood policies in effect during Sandy were written by
WYO Carriers. The rest were issued by FEMA directly.
9. The Eastern District of New York is one of the busiest district courts in the
United States. In the 12-month period ending September 30, 2013, over 8,300 civil and
criminal cases were filed in the Eastern District. Sandy filings alone thus represented
more than a 10% increase in the District’s caseload.
10. The two principle authors of this Article were two of the three magistrate
judges assigned to the Committee, along with the Honorable Gary R. Brown.
11. “A Magistrate Judge shall be assigned to each case upon the commencement
of the action . . . . [A] Magistrate Judge so assigned is empowered to act with respect
to all non-dispositive pretrial matters unless the assigned District Judge orders other-
wise.” E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. R. 72.2. E.D.N.Y. magistrate judges also handle a signifi-
cant number of civil cases on consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), including ruling
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Magistrate judges are statutorily empowered to handle such mat-
ters.12
A. Creation of the Sandy Master Calendar
The Committee’s initial step in fulfilling its mandate from the Board
of Judges was to request that the Chief District Judge create a Miscel-
laneous Civil Case (the “Master Calendar”) on the Court’s Case Man-
agement–Electronic Case Files (“CM–ECF”) system13 for the purpose
of pretrial case administration in all actions seeking insurance cover-
age for damage caused by Sandy.14 The impetus for establishing the
Master Calendar came from the review of numerous motions seeking
the pro hac vice admission of attorneys. Many attorneys representing
both plaintiffs and defendants were from out-of-state. These attorneys
had prior experience litigating cases after Hurricane Katrina and were
retained for their expertise. Since many of the individual attorneys
and law firms were handling multiple cases, rather than require the
attorneys to file multiple motions for admission pro hac vice in each
case that the attorney was appearing, the Committee set up the
Master Calendar under which an attorney could submit his or her mo-
tion for admission once, with a notation as to all of the individual
cases in which that attorney wished to appear. The single general
docket number also served other purposes. Because the individual
cases were technically not related in accordance with the Court’s Lo-
cal Rules, but many of the Committee’s orders and other filings ap-
plied to each of the cases, the Committee determined that filing
common orders under the Master Calendar, and spreading them to
individual cases as applicable, was more convenient and efficient than
individually filing under separate docket numbers.15 The Master Cal-
endar became the main platform upon which nearly all of the Sandy
litigation occurred.16
on dispositive motions and conducting bench and jury trials. E.D.N.Y. magistrate
judges as a whole handle in excess of 260 civil cases on consent at any given time.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (empowering magistrate judges “to hear and deter-
mine any pretrial matter pending before the court,” with the exception of eight specif-
ically enumerated types of motions).
13. CM–ECF is the Federal Judiciary’s comprehensive case management system
for all bankruptcy, district, and appellate courts. CM–ECF allows courts to accept
filings and provides access to filed documents online. CM–ECF gives access to case
files by multiple parties, and offers expanded search and reporting capabilities. The
system also offers the ability to immediately update dockets and download documents
and print them directly from the court system.
14. See Administrative Order 2014-3, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41).
15. CM–ECF case participants receive email notifications of all case filings, sched-
uled and adjourned conferences, and court orders and rulings.
16. The day after the Master Calendar was created, the Committee issued Practice
and Procedure Order No. 1, which directed the use of the “In re Hurricane Sandy
Cases” caption and 14-MC-41 docket number for filings in all cases. Practice and Pro-
cedure Order No. 1, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 3 at 1–2. Prac-
tice and Procedure Order No. 1 also directed all counsel requiring pro hac vice
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B. Correcting Improperly-Filed Cases & Ascertaining Full Scope
of Sandy Mass Litigation
Prior to the appointment of the Committee, it became apparent that
the plaintiffs’ counsel improperly joined in mass complaints the claims
of multiple property owners who held policies with the same insur-
ance company.17 Although the plaintiffs argued that it would be “con-
venient and efficient” to proceed by joining these claims against one
insurer, and would produce a “considerable savings in terms of filing
fees,”18 the practice violated the Court’s related case rule.19 Not only
had the Court previously held that the plaintiffs cannot avoid paying
statutorily-mandated filing fees through improper mass joinder,20 but
several district judges had already dismissed Sandy complaints sua
sponte based on the improper joinder of numerous plaintiffs and
properties in one action.21
In some cases, individual plaintiffs filed separate actions for dam-
ages as to the same property simply because those plaintiffs held flood
insurance and homeowner’s insurance policies with different insur-
ance carriers. The Committee identified eighty-one such properties
with separate cases filed against a flood and wind insurer.22 As each
carrier could contend that the damages implicated the other insurer’s
policy, this presented the possibility of inconsistent judgments. Fur-
ther complicating these matters, some cases involving the same prop-
admissions to submit their applications on the Master Calendar and “spread” them to
each of the individual Sandy cases to which they applied. (Id. at 3–4). Practice and
Procedure Order No. 1 was subsequently modified twice. See Practice and Procedure
Order No. 2, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 25; Practice and Pro-
cedure Order No. 3, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 164.
17. See, e.g., Complaint, Baiardi, et al. v. The Standard Fire Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-
5912 (SJF)(AKT) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF No. 1 (85 properties joined in one
action); Complaint, Funk, et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5933 (JS)(GRB)
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF No. 1 (147 properties); Complaint, Downs, et al. v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 13-CV-5957 (CBA)(CLP) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013), ECF
No. 1 (11 properties); Complaint, Dante, et al. v. Nat’l Flood Ins. Program, No. 13-
CV-6297 (ARR)(JO) (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 1 (42 properties); CMO No.
1, supra note 3, at Exhibit A (listing other mass joined actions).
18. Letter, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 65 at 3.
19. “A civil case is ‘related’ to another civil case . . . when, because of the similar-
ity of facts and legal issues or because the cases arise from the same transactions or
events, a substantial saving of judicial resources is likely to result from assigning both
cases to the same judge and magistrate judge.”  E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. R. 50.3.1. Sandy
cases involving different properties are not related because even though they may
involve the same weather event and similar insurance policies and legal issues, causa-
tion is always an individual determination that is highly fact specific. Id.
20. See In re BitTorrent Adult Film Copyright Infringement Cases, Nos. 11 CV
3995, 12 CV 1147, 12 CV 1154, 2012 WL 1570765, at *12–13 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom, Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe 1, 288
F.R.D. 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
21. See Dante, 2013 WL 6157182, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013); Baiardi, 2013
WL 6157231, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2013); Funk, 2013 WL 6537031, at *6–8
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2013).
22. See CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at Exhibit B.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-2\TWR203.txt unknown Seq: 7 19-MAR-19 11:19
2019] MASS LITIGATION 163
erty were filed separately in the Brooklyn and Central Islip
courthouses and assigned to different sets of judges.23
A third problem was that there was no efficient way to identify
cases brought because of Sandy. Although CM–ECF allows federal
courts to effectively manage cases, there was no way for counsel to
indicate that each case was related to Sandy when filed, apart from
indicating as such in the body of the complaint. Accordingly, the
Court could not simply query CM–ECF to produce a list of Sandy
cases to relate to the Master Calendar. Upon the creation of the
Master Calendar, the Court endeavored to determine the full extent
of the Sandy filings, which required the judges to manually open the
complaint to identify whether it was a Sandy-related case. That pro-
cess proved to be unnecessarily cumbersome, inefficient, and ulti-
mately ineffective.
Thus, one of the first major issues tackled by the Sandy Committee
was to deal with the misjoinder and nonjoinder of cases, as well as
ascertain the full breadth of Sandy cases that were and would be filed
in the EDNY and determine whether there was an effective and effi-
cient way to group such cases going forward. To accomplish these
tasks, the Committee ordered the plaintiffs’ counsel in all Sandy cases
to submit: (1) a list identifying all Sandy-related cases by name of
plaintiff, docket number, and type of insurance policy; and (2) a sepa-
rate letter pursuant to Local Rule 50.3.1(d) explaining how counsel
proposed to group the cases (whether based on the similarity of facts,
legal issues, or policy exclusions) which might result in a substantial
saving of judicial resources if the cases were assigned to the same dis-
trict judge and magistrate judge.24 In its Order, the Committee also
directed counsel to identify any cases that were amenable to early me-
diation, or where mediation had already been attempted without suc-
cess.25 The defendants had one week to respond to the plaintiffs’
proposals.26
C. Sandy Case Management
The second major issue for the Sandy Committee was to adopt a
uniform case management system that could resolve all Sandy cases
efficiently and expeditiously. In an effort to develop such a system, the
Committee considered written submissions from the parties, some of
which included sample case management orders used by federal
courts following storm events in Louisiana and Texas.27 Afterwards,
the Committee held an initial conference on February 5, 2014, in the
23. Id.
24. See Order, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 6.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See e.g., Letter, Downs, et al. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., No. 13-cv-5957
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013), ECF. No. 20; Letter, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-
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EDNY’s ceremonial courtroom,28 during which the Court and the
parties debated an appropriate procedure for handling the Sandy
cases going forward.29 Over one hundred attorneys attended the con-
ference, representing several hundred homeowners and insurers.
1. Case Management Order No. 1
After the initial conference, the Committee issued Case Manage-
ment Order No. 1 (“CMO No. 1”) to “facilitate the efficient resolu-
tion of these matters in a manner designed to avoid duplication of
effort and unnecessary expense.”30 CMO No. 1 became the central
foundation upon which all Sandy cases were litigated. In CMO No. 1,
the Court appointed Liaison Counsel for both the plaintiffs and the
defendants (“Liaison Counsel”), established a procedure for ensuring
proper joinder and relation of cases, and ordered the voluntary dis-
missal of certain unsupportable state-law claims.31 The heart of CMO
No. 1, however, was the establishment of mandatory, uniform discov-
ery practices and the requirement of participation in an alternative
dispute resolution process (“ADR”).32
a. “Uniform Automatic Discovery Practices”
Pursuant to CMO No. 1, the plaintiffs were given sixty days from
the filing of an answer to provide to the defendants: (1) the name of
each insurer and each policy’s number related to the property or the
plaintiff; (2) the claim numbers for any claims made for losses relating
to Sandy;33 (3) the address of each property and the current address of
the plaintiff;34 (4) an itemized statement of claimed damages for each
41), ECF No. 65 at 3; Certain Defendants’ Proposed Case Management Order for the
NFIP Cases, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 201.
28. Order, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 81.
29. Transcript, Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 718-5.
30. See CMO No. 1, supra note 3. A copy of CMO No. 1 is annexed hereto. CMO
No. 1 was designed to “facilitate the efficient resolution of these matters in a manner
designed to avoid duplication of effort and unnecessary expense.” CMO No. 1 at 1. In
issuing CMO No. 1, the Committee recognized the need to balance the interests of
the property owners, many of whom had been “rendered homeless for a time and who
may be left without the necessary records or access to qualified contractors to effect
repairs”, with the interests of insurers from being “safeguard[ed] [ ] from meritless or
inflated claims.” Id. at 2.
31. CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 1–6.
32. Other courts have utilized model case management plans in relation to devas-
tating weather events. See, e.g., Letter, Downs, 13-CV-5957 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2013),
ECF No. 20-1. Case Management Order No. 1 was unique in at least one important
respect, a mandatory requirement of participating in an alternative dispute resolution
procedure, whether arbitration, mediation or settlement conference. CMO No. 1,
supra note 3, at Point V.
33. This was required because many property owners had previously filed claims
directly with FEMA through the administrative process and had received partial re-
imbursement for their losses.
34. This was necessary because many of the plaintiffs had been displaced due to
the extensive damage to their homes.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-2\TWR203.txt unknown Seq: 9 19-MAR-19 11:19
2019] MASS LITIGATION 165
property, including contents; (5) a statement as to whether any
amounts were paid on the policy or offered to be paid, the amount
claimed in the lawsuit, and an itemized statement of the items for
which plaintiffs were making a claim that remain unpaid or were un-
derpaid; (6) if the plaintiff had not received any reimbursement from
their insurer, the plaintiff was asked to give the reasons for nonpay-
ment that were provided by the insurer; and (7) a statement whether
there were any prior efforts at mediation or arbitration of their claim.
Simultaneously, the plaintiffs were to provide a category of critical
documents for their cases, including any: (1) loss estimates provided
by other insurers; (2) adjusters’ reports; (3) engineering reports; (4)
photographs of their property and the contents of their homes both
before and after the loss; (5) claim log notes; (6) documents relating to
repair work performed on their property—including contracts, bids,
estimates, invoices or work tickets for completed work; (7) documents
reflecting any payments made from any insurer, from FEMA, or from
any governmental programs; (8) documents relied upon by the plain-
tiff to satisfy the Proof of Loss requirements and supporting documen-
tation required by SFIP,35 and (9) written communication between the
insured and the insurer relating to the loss, including the Proof of Loss
required by the policy.
Defendants were also required to provide certain categories of in-
formation within sixty days of the filing of an answer. These included
the following: (1) an explanation as to why coverage was declined if
no payment was made under the policy, including: (a) policy exclu-
sions that apply; (b) if coverage was denied because of nonpayment of
premiums; (c) if there is a dispute as to the nature of damage and its
coverage under the policy; (d) if there is a dispute as to the value of
the claimed losses; and, (e) any other legal basis for denial; (2) the
insurer’s explanation of the dispute if the insurer paid or offered to
pay; and (3) whether mediation or arbitration was attempted. The de-
fendants were also directed to provide certain documents within that
same period of time. Among these were: (1) documents in the claims
files, including any letters declining coverage or notices of nonpay-
ment of premiums; (2) any documentation assessing the claimed
loss—including adjusters’ reports, engineering reports, contractor’s
reports, photographs, and other evaluations of the claims; (3) the
names and addresses of the adjusters; (4) claim log notes; (5) records
of payments made to the insured; and (6) expert reports or other writ-
ten communications that analyze or describe the scope of loss or de-
fenses under the policy.
The parties’ respective automatic disclosures became the first phase
of discovery in lieu of the initial disclosures required by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26 and “in the absence of a showing to the contrary
35. 44 C.F.R. 61, App. A(1), Art. VII (J)(3), (4).
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. . . document requests and interrogatories.”36 Additionally, CMO No.
1 also directed the parties in each case to meet, confer, and exchange
any additional information that they believed would be reasonably
helpful in readying cases for mediation, arbitration, or settlement con-
ference.37 The parties were also ordered to provide the Committee
with a list of commonly occurring legal issues which they might antici-
pate occurring based upon their prior experience litigating such cases.
b. Reconsideration of CMO No. 1 Denied
Shortly after its issuance, the WYO carriers sought reconsideration
of CMO No. 1, arguing that the Committee had denied or delayed
their right to conduct formal discovery.38 The carriers contended that
because all formal discovery in the NFIP cases was barred pending
completion of the process established by the Committee “as to all of
those NFIP cases that the parties already know cannot be resolved
without formal discovery, six months will have been lost.”39 The carri-
ers argued that postponing their right to formal discovery would inva-
riably slow the resolution of the cases and was “simply
counterproductive.”40 “None of these cases will resolve without for-
mal discovery,” they predicted, while another attorney predicted that
the claims would average eight years to resolve based on his experi-
ence. One carrier condemned the process as raising “constitutional
[and] due process issues.”41
In rejecting the WYO carriers’ efforts to modify CMO No. 1 and
resist the early mediation process, the Committee noted that there is
no due process right to a particular form, quantum, or type of discov-
ery.42 The Court recognized its obligation to limit the frequency and
extent of discovery where strict adherence to formal discovery devices
would be inconvenient, burdensome, or unnecessarily expensive.43 By
36. CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 6.
37. One area of concern that was raised was the question of privilege. Documents
which evidenced a communication between counsel and client, which would be pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege, communications between or among plaintiffs’
counsel, defendants’ counsel, or documents created in anticipation of litigation were
areas of particular concern. The CMO required that within fourteen days prior to the
production of the required documentation, the party claiming privilege was to provide
a privilege log.
38. Report of Defense Liaison Counsel for the NFIP Cases, Hurricane Sandy
Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 269
39. Id. at 10–11.
40. Id. at 15.
41. Id. at 12, n. 7.
42. Case Management Order No. 3 (Clarification & Denial of Reconsideration of
CMO #1), Hurricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 311, at 5 (citing Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 2212 (1973) (hereinafter, “CMO No. 3”).
43. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C), “the court must limit the frequency or
extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules . . .” ) (emphasis added); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2)(B) (Court “may modify the timing of disclosures [and] modify
the extent of discovery.”); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 593 n. 13 (2007)
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contrast to the uniform plan set out in CMO No. 1, the piecemeal
production of document requests, interrogatories, and requests to ad-
mit by hundreds of insurers’ and plaintiffs’ counsel in over 1,000 cases
— with inevitable disputes as to scope and relevance — would result
in a significant cost to the parties, drain the Court’s resources, and
inevitably delay resolution of many of these cases for years.
Moreover, as the Committee explained, CMO No. 1 did not deny
defendants the right to engage in discovery; instead, it “imposed a
more rigorous and efficient process than the so-called ‘formal’ discov-
ery urged by the carriers,” and it was adopted after “considerable in-
put” from both sides.44 The Committee held that the discovery
management tools employed in CMO No. 1 were a “well-established
and recognized means of effectively managing complex cases.”45 In
issuing CMO No. 1, and those that followed, the Committee consid-
ered that these cases presented a massive undertaking for all involved,
and there was a need to balance (1) the concerns of the victims; (2)
the need for expeditious review of the victims claim; and (3) the need
to ensure that the claims were valid and covered by the policies. The
Committee declared that this was “not a time for ‘business as usual;’
[e]xtraordinary circumstances call for extraordinary measures.”46
2. Case Oversight and Subsequent Case Management Orders
Shortly after entry of CMO No. 1, the Committee determined the
most efficient way to monitor individual cases going forward and en-
sured that the parties adhered to CMO No. 1. It decided that the indi-
vidual Sandy cases would be assigned to the three Committee
members by the insurer in order to equally distribute the cases (ap-
proximately 475 each), and this distribution would foster a more effi-
cient monitoring system both for the Court and the parties. Each
Committee member then became a “settlement judge” under the
CM–ECF system to each case against their assigned insurers. As des-
ignated settlement judges, each Committee member could then sched-
ule conferences as necessary to oversee their respective cases.47
(courts can “adopt[ ] special procedures for managing potentially difficult or pro-
tracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal ques-
tions, or unusual proof problems” in a “flexible process”); In re Subpoena Issued to
Dennis Friedman,  350 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The federal rules give district
courts broad discretion to manage the manner in which discovery proceeds.”).
44. CMO No. 3, supra note 42, at 6.
45. Id. (citing Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth §11.422); see also B.F.
Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 523 (2d Cir. 1996) (endorsing trial court’s broad
authority to control discovery in complex multi-party litigation, including measures
adopted by the Committee, such as “time limits, schedules for discovery, and limita-
tions of deposition discovery. . . .”), decision clarified on denial of reh’g, 112 F.3d 88
(2d Cir. 1997).
46. CMO No. 3, supra note 42, at 7.
47. The designation of Committee members to each case did not supplant the au-
thority of the originally assigned district and magistrate judges. Those judges re-
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Throughout the life of the Sandy litigation, the Committee mem-
bers held hundreds of status conferences, ruled on discrete issues in
individual cases, convened settlement conferences when appropriate,
and referred cases to mediation or arbitration when ready.48 Although
CMO No. 1 provided a clear and efficient procedure through which
discovery could be conducted and cases were quickly referred to me-
diation, arbitration, or settlement conference, several systemic imped-
iments arose that threatened to derail the expeditious resolution of
hundreds of cases (mostly Flood). These issues were raised by Liaison
Counsel or sua sponte by the Committee following status conferences
in individual cases, and many were resolved through the entry of sepa-
rate case management orders. But for the coordinated management of
these cases through a committee of judges, these issues may have pre-
vented the efficient resolution of the cases, increased expenses for the
parties, and wasted scarce judicial resources through piecemeal, re-
peated resolution.
a. Proof of Loss Issues – CMO Nos. 2, 7 and 8
In March 2014, after receiving the lists of commonly occurring legal
issues from Liaison Counsel as required by CMO No. 1, the Commit-
tee became aware of an unknown but potentially large number of
Flood cases that were subject to fatal defects as a result of the pur-
ported failure to submit compliant proofs of loss under the NFIP and
FEMA’s regulations.49
In order to recover under an SFIP, the NFIP regulations state that
an insured must comply with certain conditions precedent. Congres-
sional mandate and the Constitution require strict compliance with
the regulations.50 One requirement is that the insured must file a
proof of loss and supporting documents within sixty days of the loss.51
mained assigned to each case and could exercise their authority as necessary or
desired.
48. See e.g., Transcript of Status Hearing on Hurricane Sandy Cases before the
Honorable Gary R. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge, In re Hurricane Sandy
Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 485; Transcript of Civil Cause for Telephone Confer-
ence before the Honorable Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., In re Hurricane Sandy Cases,
(No.14-MC-41), ECF No. 456; Transcript of Civil Cause for Initial Conference Before
the Honorable Cheryl L. Pollak, Bassetti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 13-CV-6648 (ERK)
(E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014), ECF No. 66.
49. Case Management Order No. 2 (Proof of Loss Issues in NFIP Cases), Hurri-
cane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 308, at 1 (hereinafter, “CMO No. 2”);
See also Transcript of March 27, 2014 Conference, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-
MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014), ECF No. 327 at 5–25; Report of Defense Liaison
Counsel, 14-MC-41, ECF No. 269 at 5–6; Report of Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel in
Response to Defendants’ Report and List of Commonly Occurring Legal Issues, Hur-
ricane Sandy Cases, (No. 14-MC-41), ECF No. 280 at 19–24 (hereinafter, “Plaintiffs’
Report”).
50. Decosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 730 F.3d 76, 83 (1st Cir. 2013).
51. FEMA’s website defines “Proof of Loss” as a “form used by the policyholder
to support the amount they are claiming under the policy.” The proper form—086-0-
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Filing a proof of loss has been held as a condition precedent to filing
an action in federal court.52
While the law is clear that filing a proof of loss is a prerequisite to
recovery, it is less clear as to the proper application of these require-
ments. Although FEMA regulations prescribe a particular form for a
proof of loss—FEMA Form 086-0-9—courts have grappled with what
exactly constitutes a proof of loss.53 Similarly conflicting guidance ex-
isted as to the proper application of the one-year statute of limitations
for filing an NFIP case vis-à-vis the proof of loss filing requirement;
particularly following the time extension and expedited procedure af-
forded to victims of Hurricane Katrina and Sandy.54
In Sandy’s aftermath, homeowners faced tremendous difficulties
finding independent adjusters to perform site inspections and to pro-
vide detailed estimates of damages incurred and the estimated re-
placement values. In addition, there were simply not enough
contractors or construction materials available in the region for home-
owners to independently estimate the cost of repair work—much less
perform the actual repairs necessary. Even the supplies to repair these
homes were unavailable.55 Similarly, many homeowners repaired their
9—is available on the FEMA website. FEMA regulations provide that while an insur-
ance adjuster sent by FEMA or the WYO carrier to investigate a policy holder’s claim
may provide the policy holder with the Proof of Loss claim form, and may assist in
completing the form, “this is a matter of courtesy only,” and the homeowner must
submit the Proof of Loss within sixty days after the loss regardless of whether the
adjuster provides it or not. This may differ from state law insurance regulations de-
pending on the jurisdiction. In New York, for example, the Insurance Law provides
that a claim cannot be denied for failure to submit a proof of loss unless the insurer
provides the insured with written notice that it requires a proof of loss and provides
the suitable forms. N.Y. Ins. L. § 3407 (McKinney).
52. DeCosta, 730 F.3d at 84 (holding that “compliance with the proof-of-loss pro-
vision serves as a condition [ ] precedent to a waiver by the federal government of its
sovereign immunity.”); Jacobson v. Metropolitan Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 171,
176 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding summary judgment against policyholder who submitted
a proof of loss but left the total damages line blank on the form).
53. See, e.g., Decosta, 730 F.3d at 26 (finding that a contemporaneous submission
of a written estimate as to disputed sums, along with two properly completed proof of
loss forms for stipulated losses, did not constitute a proper proof of loss).
54. Compare Qader v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 543 F. Supp. 2d 558, 562
(E.D. La. 2008) (“[t]he one year time-bar does not begin, as the government claims,
one year from the date FEMA denies a claim based on an adjuster’s report”), with
“Interplay Between the Extension of the Proof of Loss Deadline for NFIP-Insureds
Damaged By Meteorological Event Sandy,” In re Hurricane Sandy Cases (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 13, 2013), ECF No. 269-1 at 3 (“FEMA Memo”). (“when the claim may be
denied for reasons that do not require an adjuster’s report or Proof of Loss from the
insured . . . the insured [ ] still had a full year from the date of that denial letter to [ ]
file a lawsuit.”); cf. Plaintiffs’ Report at 20 (“FEMA’s and the WYO carriers’ position
is that the deadline to file a lawsuit may expire before its own extended, eighteen-
month proof of loss deadline to present a claim.”).
55. One anecdote is particularly illustrative. An enterprising young man, whose
water heater was destroyed by the flooding, realized that Home Depot and Lowes
had completely sold out of replacement water heaters due to the high demand after
the Hurricane, so he drove to the middle of Pennsylvania, purchased eight water heat-
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homes by themselves or with friends and family because of the lack of
licensed contractors. Of course, many could not begin repair work un-
til they received their insurance payout. The elderly were hit particu-
larly hard. Their first concern was to find somewhere else to live.
Their homes deteriorated further because they lacked the necessary
funds to begin repair work.56 All of these issues manifested in the
plaintiffs’ continuing difficulty in filing compliant proofs of loss under
the NFIP.
In “an unprecedented action,” FEMA recognized the “difficulties
insureds damaged by [ ] Sandy experienced evaluating damage and
supporting their flood insurance claim” by extending the deadline to
submit proofs of loss from sixty days to eighteen months.57 FEMA
explained that the extension was an “effective mechanism that allows
insureds to fully present their claims,” and reflected “FEMA’s com-
mitment to facilitating the ability of individuals insured by the NFIP
to seek payment.”58
As a result of the difficulty in performing site inspections, obtaining
independent estimates of losses, and submitting particularized proofs
of loss, the plaintiffs’ counsel in approximately 200 Sandy cases re-
tained a licensed inspection service, Canopy Claims, to submit
placeholder proofs of loss. These placeholders were timely submitted
without an independent site inspection but were based on an estimate
of various categories of damages that similar property owners exper-
ienced in the surrounding areas. The defendants objected in hundreds
of Sandy cases to the placeholders and to the plaintiffs’ failure to pro-
vide documents sufficient to identify other proofs of loss issues in hun-
dreds of cases. The defendants indicated that these problems would
result in the inability to engage in mediation of such cases.
Recognizing that CMO No. 1 called for the parties to disclose docu-
ments and information sufficient to uncover any proof of loss and stat-
ute of limitations issues,59 it was clear to the Sandy Committee that
such information had not yet been sufficiently disclosed and, in light
of the placeholder proof of loss issue, it was substantially likely that
ers and returned to New York. He proceeded to sell the other seven immediately to
neighbors who also had lost their water heaters. Of course, for those homeowners
who purchased supplies from independent vendors such as this individual, there were
no credit card receipts and no invoices to provide the necessary backup for the Proof
of Loss that was demanded by the carriers before reimbursement could be made.
56. One elderly woman, who had no funds to repair the home she had lived in all
her life, went to live with distant relatives. By the time the insurance company ad-
juster got around to visiting her home to assess the damage, the mold from the flood
waters had spread throughout the house, climbing through the walls to the second
floor. Not only was the house dangerously unsafe, but the mold was so entrenched
that the house had to be demolished. She lost everything.
57. FEMA Memo, supra note 54, at 2.
58. Id. at 2, 5.
59. See CMO No. 2, supra note 49, at 2.
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these issues would be litigated in a large number of cases.60 In order to
provide plaintiffs with sufficient notice to remedy any defects in their
proofs of loss filings before the expiration of the FEMA extended
eighteen-month deadline (April 29, 2014), and to serve the interests of
the parties and the Court by potentially reducing unnecessary litiga-
tion and related expenses, the Committee required counsel for de-
fendants in each Flood case to disclose to opposing counsel in writing
whether they intended to contest the receipt, form, or amount of the
proofs of loss submitted by the plaintiffs.61 In turn, counsel for plain-
tiffs in each such case were ordered to disclose to the defendant: (a)
whether the plaintiff filed one or more proofs of loss; (b) approxi-
mately when they were filed; and, (c) the total amount of losses identi-
fied therein.62 Armed with such information, the plaintiffs could take
steps to cure any proof of loss deficiencies before the extended dead-
line and, if necessary, dismiss any improperly filed cases without
prejudice in favor of administrative resolution.
Proof of loss issues persisted after the issuance of CMO No. 2. In
particular, FEMA’s position was unclear about placeholder proofs of
loss and whether the uncertainty would prevent successful mediation
in these cases. This persistence required the Committee to issue two
additional CMOs,63 the combined effect of which required FEMA to
indicate whether it would resist mediation and settlement of problem-
atic proof of loss cases. Ultimately, after five months of litigation, the
proof of loss issues were resolved. FEMA agreed to permit potentially
problematic cases, including placeholder cases, to be mediated subject
to FEMA waivers of any proof of loss filing deficiencies.64
Concurrent with litigating the proof of loss issues, the Committee
was reminded that many plaintiffs continued failing to produce all re-
ceipts, invoices, bank records, or other proof of payment for repairs
that was completed. Accordingly, the Court ordered all plaintiffs to
60. Id. at 6 (“It is impossible to ascertain at this juncture the number of cases
before this Court in which defendants will assert a failure to file proofs of loss, but
one may infer that it is likely to be substantial.”). CMO No. 2 was subsequently re-
vised to remove an unintended footnote. See CMO No. 2, ECF No. 321.
61. Id. at 8.
62. Id.
63. Case Management Order No. 7, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases (E.D.N.Y. June
4, 2014), ECF No. 391; Case Management Order No. 8, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases,
14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2014), ECF No. 422.
64. See Letter, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER)
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014), ECF No. 494 at 9 (“Based on the unique nature of these
proceedings and the manner in which claims were presented in this case, FEMA
agrees with the Court’s statement that mediation will be ‘the most efficient and equi-
table way’ to resolve many cases. Accordingly, FEMA will permit Write-Your-Own
insurance (WYO) companies to participate in mediation and to request FEMA’s
waiver of provisions of the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP). FEMA will grant
those requests as appropriate, and the Agency will not consider the placeholder proof
of loss, by itself, to be a bar to settlement.”); Electronic Order, In re Hurricane Sandy
Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2014).
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produce such information by July 31, 2014, or provide to defendants
the names and addresses of any workmen, contractors, or subcontrac-
tors who performed repair work on their homes. Defendants could
use this information to serve subpoenas, but only if the subpoena pro-
cess was conducted diligently so as not to further delay proceedings.65
b. Discovery Outside of CMO No. 1, Expert Reports,
and Site Inspections—CMO No. 3
Recurring issues concerning certain plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit
and possible pre-existing property damage caused by Hurricane Irene
also threatened to delay the resolution of many cases. In several of
such cases, the defendants filed formal motions to the assigned magis-
trate judges to proceed outside the scope of CMO No. 1, prompting
the Sandy Committee to remind the parties that CMO No. 1 required
them to cooperate in exchanging relevant information. Even if such
information was outside the scope of CMO No. 1, the Sandy Commit-
tee urged both sides “to provide any information that would reasona-
bly be helpful to their adversary in evaluating the case for mediation/
arbitration purposes.”66 The defendants additionally feared losing
their right to obtain such discovery if the plaintiff refused to provide it
voluntarily. Accordingly, the Sandy Committee directed the parties to
memorialize any dispute in a letter to opposing counsel outlining the
information sought. The Sandy Committee noted that “[a]t this stage,
such writing will preserve a party’s rights without burdening the liti-
gants and the Court with unnecessary motion practice.”67
The scope of the expert disclosures was another issue that arose and
required clarification. The Liaison Counsel for the WYO Carriers
questioned whether expert reports were subject to disclosure under
CMO No. 1. Despite the fact that CMO No. 1 expressly provided for
production of “all expert reports and/or written communications that
contain any description or analysis of the scope of loss or any defenses
under the policy.”68 Some questioned whether the parties were re-
quired to retain an expert and prepare such a report. The Committee
clarified that the report must be provided to the extent that a report
was prepared prior to the issuance of CMO No. 3. At the same time,
however, the Committee clarified that CMO No. 1 did not impose an
affirmative duty to create such a report if none then existed.
Around the same time, the Liaison Counsel for the WYO Carriers
requested a sixty-day delay of CMO No. 1’s mandated alternative dis-
pute resolution procedures to permit defendants to conduct “site in-
65. CMO No. 8 at 4.
66. CMO No. 3, supra note 42, at 8 (quoting CMO No. 1 at 9).
67. Id. at 9.
68. CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 9.
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spection[s] in all of the NFIP cases.”69 The WYO carriers contended
that, given their prior experience with potential fraud with Hurricane
Ike in Texas, site inspections of each property were needed to uncover
similar fraud with respect to Sandy claims. In denying the request, the
Committee noted that at that time more than 500 NFIP cases were
filed, and that site inspections of all such properties would require in-
vasive examination of homes; and that such inspections would be bur-
densome, costly, and unnecessarily delay the resolution of the cases.70
Instead, the Committee ordered the attorneys to meet, confer, and
identify thirty sample properties to inspect, and then defendants
would inspect them within thirty days. The results would be shared
with the plaintiff’s counsel fifteen days thereafter.71 Subsequently, the
issue of site inspections was not raised on a macro level until almost
six months later.72
c. Lack of Answers and Notices of Appearance – CMO No. 4
As a consequence of the original misjoinder of the plaintiffs, one
problem that quickly surfaced in many cases was the absence of an-
swers. By April 24, 2014, the Committee identified over 449 cases that
were pending for some time and without an answer.73 In some in-
stances, answers were filed in those cases, but not in the individual
actions following severance and re-filing. Similarly, in many cases, no
attorney filed a notice of appearance on behalf of the defendant.
Without answers, CMO No. 1’s automatic discovery requirements
would not trigger, which seriously undermined the expeditious resolu-
tion of these cases. Thus, the Committee issued CMO No. 4 and set
deadlines for the defendants’ counsel to file notices of appearance and
answers.
d. Recurring Discovery Deficiencies – CMO Nos. 5 & 6
Following initial conferences on May 1, 2014, in nine different
Flood cases, Magistrate Judge Pollak identified several recurring dis-
covery deficiencies that existed despite the clear requirements of
CMO No. 1.74 For example, plaintiffs had failed to produce “[a]ll doc-
69. CMO No. 3, supra note 42, at 10 (emphasis added); Court Requested List of
Questions Submitted by Liaison Counsel for the NFIP Cases, In re Hurricane Sandy
Cases (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014), ECF No. 304, at 2.
70. CMO No. 3, supra note 42, at 10.
71. Id. at 10–11.
72. Throughout the discovery period, as the Committee was conferencing individ-
ual cases, site inspection issues were raised by defense counsel with respect to individ-
ual properties. In those cases where an additional site inspection was deemed
warranted, it was ordered.
73. Case Management Order No. 4, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41
(CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2014), ECF No. 326 (“CMO No. 4”).
74. Case Management Order No. 5, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41
(CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014), ECF No. 337 at 1 (“CMO No. 5”).
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uments supporting or evidencing the claimed loss”, including receipts
for repairs and otherwise “all documents relied upon by plaintiff as
satisfying Proof of Loss requirements and documentation required by
SFIP 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App.A(1), Art. VII, J(3), (4).”75 Accordingly,
on May 2, 2014, the Sandy Committee ordered counsel for all defend-
ants to provide the Court with a list of commonly occurring discovery
deficiencies they had identified and believed would prevent meaning-
ful mediations or settlement conferences from being conducted, along
with a list of docket numbers of the cases in which each such defi-
ciency occurred.76 The Sandy Committee also ordered that to the ex-
tent that plaintiffs were aware of any of these identified deficiencies,
“they should take the necessary steps to immediately remedy such
deficiencies.”77
Subsequent to the receipt of submissions from twenty-three defend-
ants, the Sandy Committee identified twenty representative cases
where discovery deficiencies were present and ordered the parties to
appear at an in-person conference on May 22, 2014, to address these
deficiencies and discuss how to remedy them.78 After extensive collo-
quy with counsel, the parties were ordered to meet and confer on each
such problematic case by June 4, 2014, in an effort to resolve the defi-
ciencies, and by June 13, 2014, to provide a list to the Court of any
cases in which unresolved deficiencies would prevent referrals to me-
diation, arbitration or settlement conference.79
e. Renewal of Request for Site Inspections and Non-Party
Subpoenas—CMO No. 10
On September 9, 2014, the NFIP defendants again sought an ex-
tended stay of CMO No. 1’s mandatory alternative dispute resolution
procedures to conduct site inspections in all Flood cases. NFIP Liaison
Counsel contended that “new written guidance from FEMA” re-
quired them to certify that: (1) an adjuster had verified the damages;
(2) the damages were repaired; and (3) whether the amount of any
additional claims was justified in light of the documentation presented
showing the repairs.80 The defendants insisted that the “only way”
they could obtain this information was to perform a “new site inspec-
75. CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 7–8; see also Transcript of Civil Cause for Initial
Conference Before the Honorable Cheryl L. Pollak, Bassetti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 13-
CV-6648 (ERK) (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014), ECF No. 66 (“Tr. 5/1/14 Conf.”).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Case Management Order No. 6, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41
(CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014), ECF No. 380 at 3 (“CMO No. 6”).
79. In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. May
22, 2014), ECF No. 472 at 66.
80. Report by Defense Liaison Counsel for the NFIP Cases Concerning: Impedi-
ments to Settlement, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER)
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), ECF No. 509 at 1–2.
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tion” in every case.81 The defendants also asked that prior to proceed-
ing to mediation, the mediators prepare a “pre-mediation checklist”
that would verify the responses to these three questions and to make
it clear that mediation could not occur in the absence of all the neces-
sary documentation. Specifically, the defendants noted that, contrary
to the explicit requirements of CMO Nos. 1 and 8, many plaintiffs
were arriving at mediation without adequate proof of repairs with in-
formation that the defendants had not previously seen, or both.
In addition, faced with many plaintiffs’ continued inability to pro-
duce documents evidencing damages and repairs,82 several WYO car-
riers issued non-party subpoenas to Canopy Claims and SE-2
Engineering seeking all documents in their files relating to certain
properties. The plaintiffs objected because the sheer number of files in
the possession of these two entities, which had conducted much of the
estimation and engineering analysis for large numbers of plaintiffs,
would impede the progress of mediation. The defendants explained
that they believed these non-parties possessed documents relating to
repair costs that plaintiffs had not provided pursuant to CMO Nos. 1
and 8.
Under these circumstances, the Sandy Committee granted the
WYO Carriers’ request to conduct new site inspections provided they
paid all costs associated with the new inspections, they conducted the
inspections and provided a report of the inspection at least one week
prior to any scheduled mediation, and their failure to conduct a new
inspection prior to the scheduled date for mediation would not be a
valid excuse for not proceeding with the mediation.83 The Sandy Com-
mittee also prohibited the defendants from issuing subpoenas to Can-
opy Claims or SE2 Engineering unless they first demonstrated why, in
each case, they believed a subpoena was necessary in light of the
plaintiff’s production or lack of production of documents pursuant to
CMO Nos. 1 and 8, including why they believed that either Canopy
Claims or SE2 Engineering was actually in possession of relevant
materials that had not already been produced.84 The Sandy Commit-
tee would also allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to respond, but the
81. Id. at 2–4.
82. Plaintiffs faced a number of difficulties in providing the information required
by Case Management Order No. 1. Many had consulted with a contractor or sub-
contractor in order to get an estimate of the costs of repairs to their homes. Often
they had failed to retain the invoice showing the cost estimate, or more often they
never received a written invoice at all; the contractors were so busy moving from one
job to the next that payment was often in cash and no invoice was ever provided.
Even when there were invoices, defendants complained that the invoices were insuffi-
cient because they simply indicated the total cost of the job without specifying the
materials needed or labor expended, which the defendants believed that FEMA
required.
83. Case Management Order No. 10, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41
(CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014), ECF No. 552 at 4 (“CMO No. 10”).
84. Id. at 2.
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plaintiffs’ counsel were urged to make an effort to obtain all repair
records in the files of any non-party adjusters or engineers so as to
eliminate the need for subpoenas.85
IV. SANDY-DEDICATED ADR PROGRAM
Perhaps the most critical part of the EDNY’s system for managing
Sandy cases was the requirement of participation in ADR. Under
CMO No.1, within fourteen days of the exchange of discovery, the
parties must submit to either court-annexed or private arbitration or
mediation, or a settlement conference with a magistrate judge.86
Mandatory ADR proved to be the most effective mechanism through
which the EDNY quickly and efficiently resolved Sandy cases.
A. Development of Hurricane Sandy ADR Program
Since 1992, the EDNY has maintained a preeminent alternative dis-
pute resolution program overseen by Magistrate Judge Robert M.
Levy, EDNY Alternative Dispute Resolution Oversight Judge, and is
managed by the Court’s ADR Administrator.87 Local Rule 83.8,
which governs the EDNY mediation program, authorizes court-an-
nexed mediation services at a reduced rate of $600 for the first four
hours of mediation and $250 for each hour thereafter.88 The parties
are to split the fee. Local Rule 83.7, which governs the EDNY arbitra-
tion program, permits no fee arbitration services and affords counsel
the opportunity to request trial de novo upon issuance of the arbitra-
tion award.89 The arbitration program is compulsory for cases that do
not certify on the civil case cover sheet that damages exceed $150,000.
Referrals to mediation and arbitration include civil cases such as com-
mercial and contract matters, insurance, employment, labor, tort, civil
rights, and intellectual property matters. The ADR Department main-
tains a list of mediators and arbitrators, with varying areas of exper-
tise, who are appointed to serve on the panels for a three-year term.
Mediators and arbitrators must apply to the panel and receive a rec-
ommendation from the Court’s ADR Advisory Council. EDNY Local
85. Another request made by defendants was for the itemization of prior insur-
ance payments and what the payments was used for. To the extent that defendants
sought information as to whether monies received from a prior storm was used to
repair the home before Sandy, the plaintiffs were directed to provide information as
to repairs made or not paid prior to Sandy. However, the Committee declined to
require plaintiffs to indicate if insurance monies were used for repairs or for other
purposes, such as food and alternative housing.
86. CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 10, Part V. Federal courts are authorized to order
attorneys and parties to appear at alternative dispute resolution proceedings, includ-
ing mediations, arbitrations and settlement conferences. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
16(a)(1), (a)(5), (c)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(5), (b)(6) (2012).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 652 (requiring district courts to establish ADR programs).
88. Local Rule 83.8.
89. Local Rule 83.7.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-2\TWR203.txt unknown Seq: 21 19-MAR-19 11:19
2019] MASS LITIGATION 177
Rules permit attorneys to select their mediator or arbitrator from the
Court’s panel or elect to hire a private neutral. The ADR Department
also maintains a Mediation Advocacy Program (“MAP”), which con-
nects pro se litigants in employment discrimination matters with lim-
ited scope pro bono representation and pro bono mediation.
The Sandy Mediation Program was developed “on the fly,” in re-
sponse to the tremendous influx of litigation relating to Hurricane
Sandy. The Program was a success and maintained a high settlement
rate, however, administering the Program was instructive in many
ways for the Court. This first section will describe how the EDNY
ADR Department developed and administered the Program, the sec-
ond section will focus on lessons learned.
To implement the Sandy Mediation Program, Magistrate Judge
Levy and ADR Administrator Gerald Lepp recruited additional neu-
trals to the existing EDNY panel, conducted a Hurricane Sandy Medi-
ation Training, and researched existing models of post-disaster court-
annexed ADR programs.
In recruiting neutrals, the Sandy Panel drew attorneys from the
Court’s mediation and arbitration panels, the private bar, law schools,
and bar associations. Interested attorneys submitted applications to
the Court for review by the EDNY ADR Department.90 Judges Levy
and Lepp admitted ninety-six mediators and fifty-one arbitrators to
the Court’s Sandy Panel. Upon admission to the Sandy Panel, neutrals
attended a mandatory full-day training program offered by the Court.
Judge Levy appointed EDNY Sandy Mediation Panel members Si-
meon H. Baum and Peter H. Woodin to develop the training curricu-
lum.91 Baum and Woodin worked closely with the Liaison Counsel to
recruit presenters and ensure the training content was balanced.92 In
an effort to prepare for the training, the Sandy Committee ordered
the parties to identify twenty cases representative of the issues that
would commonly appear in the course of mediation. Then the Sandy
Committee members and Judge Levy would each attempt to settle
five cases in an effort to determine what the pitfalls to mediation
might be.93 Judge Levy also contacted other federal court programs
90. United States District Court Eastern District of New York ADR Neutral Ap-
plication for Sandy Cases, https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/forms/adrapplication-
sandycases.pdf [https://perma.cc/28DT-EDKV] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
91. Storm Sandy Mediation Training Materials, U.S. DIST. COURT E.D.N.Y.,
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/forms/Sandy_Program_Book_WEB.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2247-5FVR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
92. Presenters at the Mediation Training included: Plaintiffs’ Flood Liaison Coun-
sel Tracy R. Bryan, John Houtaling, and Jeffrey Major, Defendants’ Flood Liaison
Counsel Bill Trace, Plaintiffs’ Wind Liaison Counsel Javier Delgado, Rocco Calaci
(Plaintiff’s Meteorologist), Clay Morrison, and William F. Merlin, Defendants’ Wind
Liaison Counsel Jarrod T. Greisman, Andy Johnson (Defendant’s Meteorologist),
and Seth A. Schneekle, and Gerald P. Dwyer Jr.
93. See CMO No. 3, supra note 44, at 11 (requiring Liaison Counsel to identify 20
exemplary cases in which the Court would hold settlement conferences).
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that administered a high volume of post-disaster claims to learn about
the various models that were used by other courts.
The Sandy mediation training took place on May 22, 2014, and in-
cluded presentations by Chief Judge Carol Amon, Magistrate Judge
Levy, and members of the Sandy Committee. I. Ross Dickman, Mete-
orologist-In-Charge for the National Weather Service in New York,
presented a neutral overview of the storm, and Ramoncito J. DeBorja,
FEMA’s Deputy Associate Chief Counsel, presented FEMA’s view of
the legal compensation scheme under the NFIP. The plaintiff and the
defense Liaison Counsel led the latter half of the training, which in-
cluded presentations from their respective expert meteorologists and
an extensive discussion of the legal issues involved in litigating flood
and wind claims.
Shortly after the completion of the training, the Court asked all
counsel to provide the Sandy Committee the following lists: (1) cases
ready for mediation; (2) cases where discovery remains to be com-
pleted; and (3) cases that due to intractable legal issues, would require
court intervention. The plaintiffs initially sought to have a representa-
tive of FEMA present at every mediation in order to expedite settle-
ment. Although this was a sensible proposal because FEMA was
required to approve every settlement of NFIP claims, it was a non-
starter because FEMA was severely understaffed with too few FEMA
attorneys to attend every mediation without substantial delays. The
goal of the Sandy Committee was to have multiple mediations pro-
ceeding at once. In an effort to compromise, the Sandy Committee
indicated that if a settlement was reached, the case would be marked
settled but subject to FEMA’s approval.
B. Committee Oversight of the Mediation Program
In the months that followed the May 2014 Sandy Mediation training
program, the Sandy Committee members monitored the progress of
Sandy cases, held numerous conferences to ensure that the parties
complied with their obligations under the CMOs, and when appropri-
ate referred cases to mediation. As with many other aspects of the
Sandy litigation, the implementation of the Sandy Mediation Program
was not without glitches. In October 2014, the Sandy Committee was
informed in connection with the request for a trial schedule in Raimey
v. Wright National Flood Ins. Co.,94 that some 117 cases were in jeop-
ardy of not being mediated because of the defendants’ failure to dis-
close documents pursuant to CMO Nos. 1 and 3. The Sandy
Committee promptly issued CMO No. 11, which required the parties
to identify failed mediations, identify the documents that were not
produced that led to the failed mediations, and to request a confer-
ence with the assigned Sandy Committee Member within fourteen
94. Infra Point E.
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days.95 In November 2014, the parties expressed difficulties in select-
ing available mediators.96 As a result, and in light of the parties’ selec-
tion of “only a small number of the mediators from the panel of
Hurricane Sandy mediators,” the Sandy Committee instituted a new
process whereby the Court would select an available mediator should
the parties fail to do so.97 By January 2015, while 25% of the Sandy
cases were settled and 600 more already scheduled for mediation, the
Sandy Committee decided further measures were warranted by the
parties’ previous difficulties in mediating cases in Louisiana. Thus, the
Sandy Committee prohibited the parties from using mediators other
than those certified in the Sandy Mediation Program and conducting
mediations without the physical presence of the plaintiffs.98 Notwith-
standing these problems, the Sandy Committee was able to oversee
the parties’ efforts and guide the multitude of Sandy cases into
mediations.
C. Mandated Mediation Proves Effective
Parties filed a large number of Sandy cases in 2012 and early 2014,
prior to the establishment of the formal Sandy Mediation Program.
This is likely one reason that only half of the Sandy cases actively
participated in the Sandy Mediation Program.99 In designing the
Sandy Mediation Program, the Sandy Committee anticipated that
some cases would elect to arbitrate Sandy claims, however, only seven
Sandy cases entered the Court’s arbitration program.
The ADR Administrator shepherded cases through the Sandy Me-
diation Program, ensuring that counsel abided by the dates set forth in
the mediation referral orders.100 On average, cases were referred to
the Sandy Mediation Program seventy-eight days after they were
filed, and mediation sessions took place one hundred and seventeen
days after they were referred to mediation. Most cases were closed by
the Court within fifty days of completion of the mediation session, and
the average life of a mediated Sandy case was three hundred and
eighty days.
Of the 658 cases that actively participated in the Sandy Mediation
Program, a mediation session occurred in 479 cases. The parties re-
95. CMO No. 11, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER)
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014), ECF No. 566 (“CMO No. 11”).
96. CMO No. 12, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER)
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2014), ECF No. 672 (“CMO No. 12”).
97. Id.
98. CMO No. 13, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER)
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2014), ECF No. 832; CMO No. 14, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases,
14-MC-41 (CLP)(GRB)(RER) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015), ECF No. 925.
99. Active participation was signified by the parties selecting a mediator and
scheduling a mediation session.
100. EDNY mediation referral orders include a date by which (1) the parties must
select a mediator, and (2) complete the mediation.
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solved 27% of the cases that actively participated in the Sandy Media-
tion Program prior to a scheduled mediation session. A simple referral
into the mediation program thus proved to be an effective way to
prompt the parties to settle their cases.
Overall, the settlement rate for mediated Sandy cases was 66%. The
Sandy Mediation Program settlement rate improved during the Pro-
gram’s lifetime. During 2014, the settlement rate was 65%. The settle-
ment rate increased to 70% in 2015, and to 75% in 2016. One reason
for the increased settlement rate over time is that the parties became
accustomed to the Sandy Mediation Program and were better able to
anticipate the program requirements and effectively prepare their cli-
ents for mediation.
D. Settlement Conferences and Private Mediations
Although the Sandy Mediation Committee expended considerable
effort in creating and implementing the Sandy Mediation Program,
and although the parties largely bought into the Program, it was not
by any means the only way the EDNY successfully resolved the Sandy
cases. Throughout the life of the Sandy litigation, the parties settled
more than half of the cases during settlement conferences with the
Sandy Mediation Committee members or through private mediations
using mediators from outside the Sandy Mediation Program.
From the outset of the Sandy litigation the Court contemplated that
the Sandy Committee Members would hold settlement conferences.101
Whether as a means to ascertain the dynamics of the settlement of
Sandy cases to aide in the development of the Sandy Mediation Pro-
gram itself,102 or as a means to provide the parties with a no-cost alter-
native to the Sandy Mediation Program,103 the Sandy Committee held
settlement conferences in more than 200 cases. Often held en masse,
with multiple settlement conferences scheduled seriatim for the same
day, these conferences proved highly effective at resolving Sandy
cases. Those cases that did not settle at the scheduled conferences usu-
ally settled shortly thereafter, following the exchange of additional in-
formation requested by the parties.
Recognizing the benefit of resolving cases amicably through settle-
ment and seizing upon cost savings by conducting mediations en
masse, several insurers hired private mediators to resolve their cases,
which largely proved successful. In addition, WYO Carrier Standard
Fire Insurance Company created its own mediation program utilizing
specifically-trained mediators from FEMA’s alternative dispute reso-
lution office, who upon agreement as to scope and pricing of claims
101. See CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 10 (“Mediation may, at the discretion of the
Court, be conducted by a magistrate judge rather than a mediator.”).
102. See CMO No. 3, supra note 42, at 11; CMO No. 1 at 10.
103. CMO No. 1, supra note 3, at 10.
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could then submit the necessary waiver requests to FEMA’s general
counsel’s office for expedited approval.104
E. Allegations of Fraudulent Engineering Reports Threaten,
But Then Hasten Sandy Mediations
In late-September 2014, while the Sandy Mediation Program was in
full swing, the flood Liaison Counsel presented the Sandy Committee
with allegations of fraud by one of the WYO Carriers. At the time,
these allegations appeared to threaten the speedy resolution of hun-
dreds of Sandy cases. Over time, however, they proved to hasten the
resolution of the Sandy cases, and brought about larger efforts to rec-
tify improprieties in the manner in which all Sandy claims, even those
not filed in the EDNY, were resolved.
In Raimey v. Wright National Flood Ins. Co.,105 the plaintiffs,
Deborah Raimey and her husband, alleged that their home in Long
Beach, covered by an SFIP issued by WYO Carrier Wright National
Flood Insurance Company (“Wright”), were damaged and rendered
uninhabitable by Sandy-related flooding.106 Following an unsuccessful
attempt to mediate under the Sandy Mediation Program, the plaintiffs
sought a schedule for full discovery and a trial.107 In seeking that
schedule, the Raimeys argued that Wright knowingly failed to pro-
duce its original December 9, 2012, engineering report in clear viola-
tion of CMO No. 1.108 The engineering report was written by George
Hernemar of U.S. Forensic, the licensed engineer who had inspected
the Raimey’s home on Wright’s behalf, and who concluded that the
extensive damage to the foundation of their home was caused by
flooding:
The physical evidence observed at the property indicated that the
subject building was structural [sic] damaged by hydrodynamic
forces associated with the flood event of October 29, 2012. The hy-
drodynamic forces appear to have caused the foundation walls
around the south-west corner of the building to collapse.109
104. Transcript of Civil Cause for Telephone Conference before the Honorable Ra-
mon E. Reyes, Jr., supra note 48, at 3-7. Standard Fire also successfully resolved a
large number of its cases after private settlement discussions directly between the
public and independent adjusters for each side.
105. 76 F. Supp. 3d 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
106. In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. 17, 20 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014), aff’d,
Raimey, 76 F. Supp. 3d 452.
107. See Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Discovery Schedule and Set for Trial, In re Hurri-
cane Sandy Cases, 2014 WL 12771984 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014) (No. 14-MC-41),
ECF No. 551.
108. CMO No. 1 required the insurers to produce “any documentation relating to
an assessment of the claimed loss, including all loss reports and damage assessments,
adjuster’s reports, engineering reports,” “including draft reports.”  CMO No. 1, supra
note 3, at Points IV.B.2.b and IV.C.
109. Id. See also Raimey, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 460, n.4; In re Hurricane Sandy Cases,
303 F.R.D. at 26-29. The Raimeys became aware of the December 9, 2012, report
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Instead, Wright produced a nearly identical report dated January 7,
2013, purportedly authored by Hernemar and containing the same
identification number as Hernemar’s December 9 report, but which
came to the exact opposite conclusion:
The physical evidence observed at the property indicated that the
subject building was not structurally damaged by hydrodynamic
forces, hydrostatic forces, scour or erosion of the supporting soils, or
buoyancy forces of the floodwaters associated with the subject flood
event.110
According to the Raimeys, however, Hernemar told them that he did
not author a report denying that the damage to their home was caused
by Hurricane Sandy.111 The inference created by the failure to pro-
duce the original December 9 Hernemar report was that at some point
in time between the preparation of that report and the production of
the January 7 report, either United States Forensic, Wright, or some-
one else fraudulently altered the conclusion to the plaintiffs’ detri-
ment. Wright challenged the Raimeys’ contentions, disclaimed
possession or knowledge of the original Hernemar report, and moreo-
ver accused the Raimeys of violating CMO No. 1 by not disclosing
that report prior to the unsuccessful mediation.112
Rather than schedule Raimey for full discovery and a trial, Magis-
trate Judge Gary R. Brown113 scheduled an evidentiary hearing for
October 16, 2014, to receive “testimony and documentary evidence
concerning the allegations relating to U.S. Forensic Report No.
12.22.1304 and the various incarnations of that report. . . .”114 Follow-
ing the hearing, Judge Brown issued a scathing memorandum and or-
der in which he held not only that Wright violated CMO No. 1’s
disclosure obligations by failing to produce the original Hernemar re-
port,115 but also that the January 7 report was “baseless,” and moreo-
ver, that this problem might effect hundreds of Sandy flood cases:
when Hernemar permitted them to view it on his computer. While viewing the report,
Ms. Raimey took a cell phone picture of title page and causation paragraph. At that
time Hernemar also informed the Raimeys that he did not author any report that
disclaimed that the damage to their home was caused by flooding. Plaintiff’s Motion
to Set Discovery Schedule and Set for Trial, supra note 107, at 3.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to: (1) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Dis-
covery Schedule and Set for Trial, with (2) Renewed Request for CMO Compliance,
In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 2014 WL 12771984 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 14-
MC-41), ECF No. 555.
113. Judge Brown was assigned to Raimey as the settlement judge.
114. Order Setting Evidentiary Hearing and Deferring Ruling on Motion to Set
Discovery Schedule and Set for Trial, Raimey v. Wright Nat’l Flood Ins., No. 14-CV-
461 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2014).
115. In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, 303 F.R.D. 17, 29 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014), aff’d,
Raimey, 76 F. Supp. 3d 452.
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U.S. Forensic, an engineering firm retained by defendant Wright
National Flood Insurance Company (“Wright”) to examine a storm-
battered house in Long Beach, New York, unfairly thwarted rea-
soned consideration of plaintiffs’ claim through the issuance of a
baseless report. The engineer sent by U.S. Forensic opined in a writ-
ten report that the home at issue had been damaged beyond repair
by Hurricane Sandy. A second engineer, who did little more than
review the photographs taken by the inspecting engineer, secretly
rewrote the report, reversing its conclusion to indicate that the
house had not been damaged by the storm, and attributing—with-
out sufficient evidence—defects in the home to long-term deteriora-
tion. This process, euphemistically dubbed a “peer review” by U.S.
Forensic, was concealed by design from the homeowners, remained
uncovered during the Court-assisted discovery process and came to
light through near happenstance. In a misguided attempt to defend
these flawed practices, defendant has elicited evidence that this
“peer review” process may have affected hundreds of Hurricane
Sandy flood insurance claims—and possibly more.116
As a result, in addition to issuing significant remedial sanctions against
Wright pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,117
Judge Brown directed defendants in all Hurricane Sandy cases within
thirty days to provide plaintiffs with copies of all reports described in
CMO No. 1 that had not previously been produced, including:
any drafts, redlines, markups, reports, notes, measurements, photo-
graphs and written communications related thereto – prepared, col-
lected or taken by any engineer, adjustor or other agent or
contractor affiliated with any defendant, relating to the properties
and damage at issue in each and every case, whether such documents
are in the possession of defendant or any third party.118
Judge Brown’s decision in Raimey was immediately met with wide-
spread disapproval from nearly all Sandy defendants. Wright appealed
the decision to United States District Judge Joseph F. Bianco pursuant
to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.119 In addition,
FEMA and the flood and wind insurers filed nearly 100 motions seek-
ing reconsideration of Judge Brown’s order that they produce the re-
quired documents, arguing, inter alia, that the order imposed new
discovery obligations that were beyond the scope of CMO No. 1 and
violated their due process rights as they were not parties to the
116. Id. at 19.
117. Judge Brown prohibited Wright from opposing plaintiffs’ claims or supporting
its defenses with expert testimony other than from Hernemar, or by reliance upon
expert reports other than those already produced. Id. at 31. Judge Brown also re-
quired Wright’s counsel to reimburse plaintiffs’ counsel for all reasonable costs associ-
ated with motion, the hearing and all related briefing, including attorneys’ fees, travel
and transcription costs. Id. at 32.
118. Id. at 32 (emphasis in original).
119. See Appeal of Magistrate Judge Decision, Raimey, No. 14-CV-461, ECF No.
91.
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Raimey evidentiary hearing.120 Moreover, many of the insurers can-
celled previously scheduled Sandy mediations, thereby threatening
the speedy resolution of hundreds of cases.121
The Sandy Committee quickly disposed of the insurers’ efforts to
delay pending Sandy mediations by issuing CMO No. 12, which or-
dered that the mediations go forward even during the insurers’ period
to supplement their production of damage reports:
The Committee has been advised that parties have been cancelling
previously-scheduled mediations in anticipation of the production
due by December 12. In light of all circumstances here, such further
delays are unwarranted and unnecessary. Because it takes time to
finalize resolutions reached at mediation (including, in many cases,
obtaining FEMA waivers), the parties are directed to proceed with
any scheduled mediations, aware that, should the production di-
rected in Raimey affect the resolution reached, the parties will be
free to renegotiate the settlement or withdraw prior finalization. Of
course, nothing prevents defendants from accelerating the produc-
tion in those cases in which mediation has been scheduled, thereby
avoiding any further concerns.122
In so doing, the Sandy Committee agreed with Judge Brown’s finding
that the materials required to be produced “clearly fall within the am-
bit of CMO 1 and 3.”123 Subsequently, the Sandy Committee also re-
jected the plethora of motions for reconsideration, noting expressly
that the production of documents ordered by Judge Brown had clearly
been required by CMO Nos. 1 and 3, and therefore, the defendants’
due process and other arguments were at best “meritless.”124 District
Judge Bianco also quickly affirmed Judge Brown’s decision in Raimey
in its entirety, finding, inter alia, that CMO No. 1 clearly required the
production of the original Hernemar report, that Wright violated that
obligation, and, moreover, that sanctions were justified:
[I]t is absolutely clear to this Court that the process that led to the
modification of the [original Hernemar] report (including the re-
moval of observations that were inconsistent with the new conclu-
sions) was flawed, and the concealment of that initial report and the
process that led to the new report (including conduct at the eviden-
120. E.g., Notice of Motion for Reconsideration, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No.
14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2014), ECF No. 679; Memorandum & Order Re:
Raimey Reconsideration and Clarification Motions, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No.
14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2014), ECF No. 852.
121. CMO No. 12, supra note 96.
122. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at n. 1 (quoting Judge Brown’s Raimey decision).
124. Memorandum & Order Re: Raimey Reconsideration and Clarification Mo-
tions, supra note 120, at 4. See also In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2014), ECF No. 863 (denying Wright’s and amicus U.S. Forensic’s
motions to reconsider).
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tiary hearing) has prejudiced plaintiffs in terms of delay and costs in
this litigation, such that the sanctions were warranted.125
The revelation of engineering fraud was not limited to Raimey.
During briefing of the insurers’ motions for reconsideration of the
Raimey production order, the plaintiffs submitted documents which
appeared to show that another engineering firm, HiRise Engineering
(“HiRise”)126 fraudulently rewrote the reports of the licensed inspect-
ing engineers, which documented extensive damage from Sandy, to
reflect an absence of such damage or to suggest preexisting damage.127
These submissions argued that the inspecting engineer’s signature was
125. Raimey v. Wright Nat’l Flood Ins., 76 F. Supp. 3d 452, 455-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
126. Following press reports of the allegations against HiRise in these cases, the
New York State Attorney General raided HiRise’s premises in February 2015, and
Matthew Pappalardo was subsequently indicted on multiple charges of Forgery in the
Second Degree, a Class D Felony, and the Unauthorized Practice of Engineering, a
Class E Felony. On January 10, 2017, both Pappalardo and HiRise entered pleas of
guilty to Criminal Solicitation in the Fifth Degree. Pappalardo was sentenced to 3
years’ probation and a $10,000 fine; HiRise was sentenced to pay the costs of litiga-
tion in the amount of $225,000, and both were banned from providing services to the
NFIP. During the course of the investigation, it became clear that under Pappalardo’s
direction, numerous Sandy engineering reports were altered at the direction of indi-
viduals who had not investigated the properties and were not licensed engineers in
New York.
127. See Memorandum & Order Re: Raimey Reconsideration and Clarification
Motions, supra note 120, at 9 (citing ECF Nos. 830, 840 & 841). See also Shlyonsky v.
Travelers Ins., No. 13-CV-5393 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014). In Shylonsky, the plaintiff
alleged that as a result of the extensive damage caused to his home by Sandy, he made
a claim to his carrier, Travelers, seeking the full policy benefit of $250,000. Complaint
at ¶¶ 21-22, Shylonsky, No. 13-CV-5393. The claim was assigned to HiRise, a Long
Island professional engineering firm, to conduct an engineering analysis of the dam-
age caused by the storm and prepare a report. Id. HiRise assigned Harold Weinberg,
a New York State licensed professional engineer, who inspected the property, and
concluded that flood waters were 100% responsible for causing damage to the foun-
dation. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs alleged that Weinberg’s original engineering report was
significantly altered by Matthew Pappalardo, Project Manager for HiRise, removing
Weinberg’s findings and observations and adding opposite conclusions, stating that
the damage to the home was pre-existing and not Sandy-related. Id. ¶ 25. This altered
report was the basis upon which Travelers denied the vast majority of the Shlyonskys’
claim. Id. During discovery, plaintiffs learned that Pappalardo, who was not licensed
to practice engineering in New York and had never personally visited the property,
never informed Weinberg of the changes made to his report. A subsequent affidavit
submitted by Mr. Weinberg indicated that the signature on the final report had been
cut from his original report and clumsily pasted into the final version without his
authorization. Similar allegations were made in Dweck. Amended Complaint, Dweck
v. Hartford Ins. of the Midwest, No. 14-CV-6920 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2014). Mr. Wein-
berg, assigned by HiRise to conduct an engineering analysis of the damage to the
Dweck’s home, prepared a report attributing the damage to Sandy flooding. Id. ¶ 22.
The initial report was allegedly altered by Pappalardo, and reached the conclusion
that the damage was pre-existing and not due to flooding. Id. ¶ 23. The Dweck Com-
plaint alleged that the altered engineering report was never authorized by Weinberg
and that Pappalardo admitted that he “simply lift[ed] Weinberg’s signature” from the
earlier report and affixed it to the report that was used to deny the Dwecks’ claims.
Id. ¶ 27.
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cut and pasted onto the fraudulently-modified reports.128 The plain-
tiffs also alleged that there were at least two additional cases of engi-
neering fraud involving U.S. Forensic.129 Based on these troubling
allegations, the Sandy Committee scheduled an evidentiary hearing
for four cases in which such fraud allegations were raised, to be held
at the Court’s Ceremonial Courtroom in Brooklyn on February 19,
2015.130
The evidentiary hearing in these four cases never occurred.131 On
February 13, 2015, Bradley J. Kieserman, FEMA’s Deputy Associate
Administrator for Federal Insurance, informed the Sandy Committee
that:
FEMA leadership is deeply troubled by recent allegations that FEMA
and the Write Your Own companies may have relied on questionable
and subpar engineering reports when adjusting claims. . . . While
[FEMA is] unable to speak to the veracity of the allegations regard-
ing the engineering reports, [FEMA does] know our policyholders
now question the integrity of the NFIP claims process. To that end,
FEMA is committed to establishing a process to resolve all Hurricane
Sandy insurance claims where there is evidence of questionable engi-
neering practices and [is] committed to ensuring NFIP business prac-
tices going forward are fair and transparent. Consequently, [FEMA]
will be reaching out to plaintiffs’ and defendants’ liaison counsel
and Write Your Own Partners to convene a meeting with the objec-
tive of resolving all litigation stemming from questionable engineer-
ing reports, including Class Action and RICO Claims. At the same
time, [FEMA is] initiating a thorough and multi-disciplinary assess-
128. Memorandum & Order Re: Raimey Reconsideration and Clarification Mo-
tions, supra note 120, at 9.
129. Id. Steve Mostyn and members of the Mostyn Law Firm, in addition to han-
dling individual Sandy actions, including Raimey, filed three Civil RICO class action
lawsuits related to the engineering fraud. See Ramey v. U.S. Forensic, 14-CV-6861
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2014); Dweck, No. 14-CV-6920; Shlyonsky v. HiRise Eng’g PC,
No. 14-CV-7136 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014). Mostyn claimed that out of 7,000 reports
prepared by U.S. Forensic, his firm had reviewed 250 of them and determined that
248 reports on different properties were “identical.”  Unfortunately, Mostyn, who was
instrumental in the resolution of hundreds of Sandy cases, passed away unexpectedly
on November 15, 2017.
130. See Order, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5,
2015), ECF No. 969. The hearing was scheduled and rescheduled several times, and
cases subject to the hearing were added and retracted. Id. at 1-2; In re Hurricane
Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41, ECF Nos. 927, 941, 953, 1001; Electronic Order, In re
Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2015).
131. Magistrate Judge Pollak did hold an evidentiary hearing on May 20 and 21
concerning alleged engineering fraud and discovery failures in two cases. Transcript,
In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2015), ECF No. 1094;
Transcript, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015),
ECF No. 1095; see also Transcript of Telephone Conference, In re Hurricane Sandy
Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2015), ECF No. 1133. Neither of these cases
were raised previously as being problematic, and Judge Pollak never issued a decision
on these issues as they were resolved amicably after the hearing. Minute Entry, In re
Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015).
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ment of FEMA’s delivery and oversight of the Write Your Own
Program and adjustment processes, including hiring and relying
upon engineering reports to resolve flood insurance claims.132
In addition, on February 17, 2014, two days before the evidentiary
hearing was scheduled to proceed, the parties in Shlyonsky v. Trav-
elers Insurance Co., one of the cases subject to the evidentiary hear-
ing, appeared for a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge
Reyes, accompanied by Mr. Kaiserman and other FEMA representa-
tives.133 During the conference, the parties informed Judge Reyes that
they were negotiating a process to resolve all pending Hurricane
Sandy cases involving possible engineering fraud, including such cases
that were not in litigation or that had already been paid in the normal
claims process. In light of this major development and at the parties’
request, the Sandy Committee adjourned the evidentiary hearing sine
die “to allow the parties to continue conducting meaningful settlement
discussions.”134
In the months that followed, the Sandy Committee continued to
monitor the parties’ efforts to resolve all Sandy cases, including those
involving potential engineering fraud, holding periodic in-person and
telephone status conferences. The parties’ efforts proved quite effec-
tive as within six weeks from the scheduling of the evidentiary hearing
they had reached settlements in principle in over 400 flood cases and
requested that those cases be administratively closed pending final ap-
proval from FEMA.135 Nevertheless there were setbacks. Although
cases continued to settle, the Sandy Committee had to resolve a few
systemic issues that threatened to derail continued settlements across
the board.136 Following hearings, the Sandy Committee resolved each
of these issues, and the settlements continued.137
132. Letter, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015),
ECF No. 985-1, at 1 (emphasis added).
133. No. 13-CV-5393 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014), ECF No. 95; Scheduling Order, No.
13-CV-5393 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2015); Minute Entry, No. 13-CV-5393 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
17, 2015).
134. Electronic Scheduling Order, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2015).
135. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Administratively Close Tentatively Settled Cases, In re
Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015), ECF No. 1019; Let-
ter, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2015), ECF No.
1026; Letter, In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-41 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015),
ECF No. 1036.
136. See In re Hurricane Sandy Cases, No. 14-MC-4, ECF Nos. 1007, 1008, 1021,
1029, 1030, 1034 (concerning hearing on certain WYO Carriers’ efforts to extract a
release of criminal liability from plaintiffs in connection with settlement of Sandy
cases) & ECF Nos. 1044, 1045, 1052-56, 1063 (concerning hearing on (1) FEMA’s
reneging on promise of payment of attorney’s fees for settlement of claims involving
engineering fraud, and (2) subrogation of proposed settlement awards to other gov-
ernment entities).
137. Id.
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Ultimately, the affirmance of Judge Brown’s fraud findings in
Raimey on December 31, 2014, had a huge impact on the pace with
which Sandy cases were being resolved. Within three months of that
affirmance, over 400 cases were resolved, and many more were re-
solved shortly thereafter. It cannot be understated how much the
Raimey decision impacted the Sandy litigation as a whole. But for
Raimey, the EDNY might still be inundated with Sandy cases.
F. ADR Department Lessons Learned
Once the Sandy Mediation Program was complete, the ADR De-
partment identified the following ways that it could improve the ad-
ministration of dispute resolution: (1) encourage diverse mediator
selection; (2) ensure party participation; (3) conduct subject-matter
specific mediation training; (4) develop mediation advocacy resources;
(5) implement quality assurance mechanisms; (6) collect real-time
data; and (7) make referrals to mediation mandatory.
During the administration of the Sandy Program, a very small num-
ber of EDNY Sandy mediators oversaw the majority of the cases.138
The Sandy Committee observed that limited mediator selection
caused scheduling delays and slowed case administration.139 To diver-
sify the mediator selection, the Sandy Committee altered the selection
procedure and required that parties select mediators who were availa-
ble during the timeframe set forth in the mediation referral order.140
To implement this change, the ADR Department developed a listserv
where counsel could post their case caption and mediation schedule,
and Sandy Panel mediators responded directly to the requests. Under
the new procedure, failure to select a mediator in the given timeframe
would result in the Court appointing a mediator instead.141 Adding a
consequence for failure to make a timely selection encouraged diverse
mediator selection and pushed cases through the Program more
quickly and efficiently.
Another way to diversify mediator selection is to connect newly
trained mediators with experienced mentors, and to increase the num-
ber of observation and co-mediation opportunities for newer
mediators. In offering additional mentoring, newer mediators will
have the opportunity to meet and work with the attorneys that partici-
138. Only thirteen EDNY mediators were selected in ten or more cases. The most
popular mediator was selected one hundred and four times, the second most popular
mediator was selected ninety-eight times. Four Sandy mediators were selected in
forty-five percent of the cases that were referred to mediation.
139. CMO No. 12, supra note 96, at 1.
140. When an Eastern District of New York case is referred into the court’s media-
tion program, the referring judge sets a date by which the mediator must be selected
and a date by which the mediation must be completed. E.D.N.Y. Local Rule
83.8(b)(1)(A).
141. See CMO No. 12, supra note 96, at 1.
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pate in mediator selection, increasing the likelihood of a newer media-
tor’s selection.142
Lack of party participation is another issue that arose while ad-
ministering the Program. Some attorneys elected to conduct the medi-
ations in Louisiana where some of the most active plaintiff law firms
were located, but few, if any, of the plaintiffs. In response, the Sandy
Committee issued CMO No. 13 which directed plaintiffs to attend me-
diations and participate actively in the mediation session. The Sandy
Committee also prohibited the scheduling of mediations in Louisiana,
reasoning that since the actual plaintiffs in these matters were located
in the EDNY, the mediations should be located in the EDNY too. In
retrospect, requiring the mediations take place in the EDNY at the
outset of the Program would have been the best practice.
Conducting a subject-matter specific mediator training was integral
to the Sandy Mediation Program’s success. It increased attorney and
judicial confidence in the program and raised the quality of the media-
tion panel. The EDNY has adopted a similar approach to develop
training courses specific to the Fair Labor Standards Act and the
Court’s Mediation Advocacy Program (“MAP”), the latter of which
has increased referrals to that program. Future post-disaster mediator
trainings, however, should include a discussion of the psychological
impact of the disaster on the litigants and the mediation process.143
Understanding the impact of trauma on the negotiation process is
helpful when assisting those affected by natural disaster reach a nego-
tiated resolution to their case.144
When designing a post-disaster mediation program, it is important
to consider the effect of the program on pro se litigants. Very few pro
se litigants filed Sandy cases, however, it would have been best prac-
tice to develop a Mediation Advocacy Program to connect pro se liti-
gants with limited scope pro bono counsel for the purpose of
mediation. The Court currently maintains a MAP for the benefit of
pro se litigants in employment discrimination cases.145 To maintain
this program, the ADR Department conducts an annual mediation
advocacy training and maintains a list of attorneys willing to serve as
pro bono mediation advocates. This model can be replicated to assist
pro se litigants in post-disaster cases, as well as other case categories
that often involve pro se parties.
In order to maintain a high level of quality in a mediation program,
it is necessary to constantly monitor and assess the mediators and the
142. The ADR Department is currently in the process of developing a more robust
mentorship program for newer mediators.
143. Mel Rubin, Disaster Mediation: Lessons in Conflict Coordination and Collabo-
ration, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 351, 359 (2008).
144. Id. at 359.
145. Pro Se Mediation Advocacy Program, U.S. DISTRICT CT. EASTERN DISTRICT
OF N.Y., https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pro-se-mediation-advocacy-program [https://
perma.cc/HN3R-MCZ5] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
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process. The ADR Department has long requested that counsel fill
out and return a questionnaire regarding the mediation experience.
Previously, attorneys filled out and returned the survey by fax or by
mail. Many surveys were not returned, and the ones that were re-
turned were received weeks or even months after the mediation was
completed. After administering the Sandy cases, the EDNY ADR De-
partment recognized the need to update its system for collecting and
monitoring feedback. The surveys are now called “Mediation Re-
ports,” and a deadline is filed on the docket by which the ADR De-
partment must receive the report.146 Participants return Mediation
Reports electronically where the data is entered into a system and
analyzed. The ADR Department also dedicates staff resources to-
wards collecting Mediation Reports, and the number of reports re-
ceived has increased by more than 400% over the previous reporting
year.147
The ADR Department also recognized the need to modernize its
data collection and case tracking system. Prior to Sandy, the ADR
Department relied upon the Court’s electronic filing system to gener-
ate reports on case outcomes. However, the Court’s system was una-
ble to generate the reports necessary to monitor a much larger
caseload. The ADR Department has since developed its own database
to more easily administer cases and track outcomes. These improve-
ments have helped the ADR Department to accurately report data,
expedite case management, and efficiently administer a larger case
volume.148 Anticipating the need to efficiently monitor the mediations
and collect feedback is important in the design of any large-scale
ADR program.
Chief Judge Amon and the Sandy Committee were innovative to
modify the Court’s policy and implement a mandatory referral to me-
diation. CMO No. 1 included the first mandatory referral to mediation
in the EDNY’s history.149 The implementation of CMO No. 1 meant a
dramatic increase in the ADR Department’s caseload.150 In issuing
this order, the Court recognized the mediation process as integral to
the management of the Sandy litigation. The Court’s support was also
apparent through Chief Judge Amon’s participation in the mediation
146. Mediation Report, U.S. DISTRICT CT. EASTERN DISTRICT OF N.Y., https://
img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/forms/Mediation%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E89Z-
A3CD] (last visited Feb. 14, 2019).
147. ROBYN WEINSTEIN & ROBERT M. LEVY, 2016–2017 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION REPORT 6 (2017), https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/local_rules/2016-
2017_ADR_Annual_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKK5-9B3R].
148. For the 2017-2018 reporting year the ADR Department administered 429 me-
diation referrals.
149. CMO No. 1 required counsel to submit a “Notice of Consent” to either arbi-
tration or mediation within fourteen days of the exchange of discovery. CMO No. 1,
supra note 3.
150. Prior to Hurricane Sandy the highest volume of mediation referrals was 249
cases between July 1, 2003 and June 30, 2004.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-2\TWR203.txt unknown Seq: 35 19-MAR-19 11:19
2019] MASS LITIGATION 191
training and Judge Levy’s extensive involvement in developing the
program design and training model. The Sandy Committee’s constant
oversight and Case Management Orders in support of mediation were
also essential to the Sandy Mediation Program’s success.
The success of the Sandy Mediation Program is further evidenced
by the overall settlement rates, which improved during the Program’s
lifetime. However, another metric of success is the increase in refer-
rals to mediations in other cases after the Sandy Mediation Program
ended. It is the authors’ hope that in sharing the Court’s experience
administering the Program that other courts may benefit from the les-
sons we learned while responding to the influx of cases in the after-
math of Hurricane Sandy.
V. CONCLUSION
The sudden and unprecedented influx of over 1,400 Hurricane
Sandy cases presented the judges of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York with unique challenges. These
challenges required the Court to think “outside the box” and develop
a system to quickly and efficiently resolve the cases consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the applicable substantive law, and
the rule of law that must be adhered to in all cases filed in federal
court. After considering other courts’ efforts to deal with mass litiga-
tion following weather events and the input of all interested parties,
the Court developed a unique system that was innovative but at the
same time relied upon time-honored principles of case management in
the federal courts. The system proved to be instrumental in resolving
all but a small handful of cases in a little over one year from filing.
Several elements of the Court’s system to handle the Sandy cases
proved crucial in the efficient resolution of those cases. First, the as-
signment of a magistrate judges committee to develop the system and
oversee its implementation helped resolve those cases. Magistrate
judges in the Eastern District of New York, and throughout the coun-
try, have long presided over and resolved civil proceedings and have
developed expertise in doing so. Utilizing that expertise helped struc-
ture the effective system and ensure its proper implementation. Sec-
ond, the solicitation of input from all parties as to the structure of the
case management system and the appointment of Liaison Counsel
helped in resolving the Sandy cases. By seeking the parties’ input as to
the structure of the system to which they would be bound, and facili-
tating their communication with the Court through a single, consoli-
dated voice, the Court ensured both that the system would be
responsive to the parties’ needs and that they could communicate
their concerns to the Court efficiently and coherently. Third, the es-
tablishment of a Master Calendar, convening of omnibus case man-
agement conferences, and the use of case management and practice
and procedure orders efficiently resolved the cases. Addressing issues
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and communicating with all parties in all cases at once using a single
docket entry, rather than in each case individually, is far more effi-
cient and effective. Fourth, mandatory participation in a specifically-
designed alternative dispute resolution program was helpful. While
ADR programs are not new, the Sandy Mediation Program was de-
signed specifically, with input from the parties, to address issues likely
to arise during those mediations. This targeted development of the
program made it more likely to be successful. Finally, the constant
oversight of individual cases by the magistrate judges committee
helped design the case management system, and they had full knowl-
edge of all the issues that had arisen since its inception. Without the
constant oversight of the 1,400 Sandy cases, both individually and col-
lectively, it is doubtful that these cases would have been brought to
resolution so quickly. Even the best designed case management sys-
tem will not work efficiently unless cases are constantly monitored to
ensure they progress through that system to conclusion.
